Webstart Communications

      Freeh Encryption Rebutal

        This note is a brief responce to recent (7/96) testimony by Louis Freeh of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. While the note is made with respect for Mr. Freeh and for the institution of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, it is in the nature of a rebutal to aspects of Mr. Freeh's statement. This note is a personal statement from Jed Donnelley from Webstart Communications.

        Mr. Freeh states:

        ...we (the FBI) have long argued that the proliferation of unbreakable encryption ... would seriously and fundamentally threaten these critical and central public safety interests. The only acceptable answer that serves all of our societal interests is to foster the use of "socially-responsible" encryption products, products that provide robust encryption, but which also permit timely law enforcement and national security access and decryption pursuant to court order or as otherwise authorized by law.

        In rebutal I say:

        1. The idea that the proliferation of strong (e.g. "unbreakable") encryption would threaten public safety is debatable. It is my belief that even though convenient and strong encryption will make all sorts of private communication possible, I do not believe that it will significantly threaten public safety. Neither the FBI nor any law enforcement agency has presented substantive evidence that their current limited ability to intercept communications (e.g. telephone taps) has a substantial benefit for law enforcement. There is certainly anecdotal evidence of law enforcement value from telephone taps, but this evidence appears not to be statistically significant.
        2. Strong encryption capability is already available. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is an example. It is my belief that even if law is passed making it illegal to use strong encryption, such encryption will still be available to those who wish to use it to protect communication or storage used for criminal purposes.
        3. Efforts to develop effective escrowed encryption that can allow law enforcement agencies access to encrypted information under control of court orders have been shown to be fraught with technical, political, and economic difficulties. It is my belief that the costs are simply not worth the minimal value (No. 1 above). I believe that if law enforcement agencies would apply the resources that are now and will in the future be applied to the effort to tap into otherwise private communication instead to the effort to gather information by other means then law enforcement would be enhanced (not diminished as Mr. Freeh believes).

          Webstart Communications.